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Abstract
Physician ownership of in-office ancillary services (IOASs) has come under increasing scrutiny. Advocates of argue
that IOASs allow physicians to supervise the quality and coordination of care. Critics have argued that IOASs create
financial incentives for physicians to increase ancillary service volume. In this paper we develop a conceptual
framework to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with physician ownership of IOASs. There is some evidence
supporting the existence of scope and transaction economies in IOASs. Improvement in flow and continuity of
care are likely to generate scope economies and improvements in quality monitoring and reductions in consumer
transaction costs are likely to generate transaction economies. Other factors include the capture of upstream and
downstream profits, but these incentives are likely to be small compared to scope and transaction economies.
Policy debates on the merits of IOASs should include an explicit assessment of these tradeoffs.
This research was supported in part by funding from the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS).
Background
In recent years there has been considerable attention
devoted to physician ownership of health-care related
assets, with concerns raised over the effects of incentives
associated with hospital ownership [1-7], ambulatory
surgery center (ASC) ownership [8-10], and ancillary
service ownership [11-14]. Ancillary ownership has been
the focus of several recently published articles, and has
been the focus of some state-led policy initiatives aimed
at restricting physician ownership.a Ancillary ownership
generally includes ownership of free-standing ancillary
services, such as imaging centers, as well as in-office
ancillary services (IOASs), which typically includes stan-
dard imaging, advanced imaging, ultrasound, clinical
laboratory, and outpatient therapy (e.g., occupational
and physical therapy) [14].
In 1989 Congress adopted the Ethics in Patient Refer-
rals Act, commonly referred to as Stark I, which went
into effect on January 1, 1992. Stark I was amended in
1993, with the new amendments referred to as Stark II,
going into effect on January 1, 1995. Stark II added
some additional health services to the self-referral prohi-
bition, extended the prohibitions to Medicaid, and clari-
fied conditions for exceptions. The law was amended for
a third time, with the new amendments referred to as
Stark III, going into effect on December 4, 2007.
Together, the current -Stark” laws prohibit physicians
from referring Medicare patients to entities for certain
-designated health services” if the physician, or an
immediate family member of the physician, has a finan-
cial relationship with the entity. Financial relationships
are broadly defined to include investment and owner-
ship interests, as well as compensation arrangements
between a physician, or his/her family member, and an
entity [15-18].
The IOAS exception to Stark allows physicians to own
in-office ancillary services. However, according to critics,
the IOAS exception has created a loop-hole in the refer-
ral system and has contributed to recent growth in the
utilization of in-office ancillary services [14,19-23].
Advocates of the IOAS exception say that the IOAS’s
purpose is to permit physicians to supervise the quality
of care, to allow for better coordination among patients,
physicians, and ancillary services, and to provide incen-
tives for patients to adhere to recommended treatment
plans. On the other hand, it has been argued that the
exception creates financial incentives for physicians to
increase the volume of services provided [14].
The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual
framework through which to critically evaluate the tra-
deoffs associated with physician ownership of IOASs.
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Throughout the paper we use as an example the case of
orthopaedic surgery practice ownership of imaging and
physical therapy (PT). This case serves as a good exam-
ple for two reasons. First, imaging and physical therapy
are critical components of the orthopaedic continuum
of care [24-28]. Second, orthopaedic surgeon ownership
of imaging services has become a relatively common tar-
get of critics of physician ownership of ancillary services
and medical facilities [13,29-36]. To explore the ques-
tion of whether IOASs are -good or bad,” the full set of
tradeoffs should be considered. Setting aside the political
aspects of the debate, the IOAS issue is an example of a
common organizational problem faced by firms: whether
to -make or buy” various stages of the production
process.
Boundaries of physician practice
The relationship between orthopaedic practices and
ancillary services can be viewed as a -vertical relation-
ship,” where imaging can be viewed as an -upstream”
service and physical therapy can be viewed as a -down-
stream” service relative to orthopaedic treatment (Figure
1). Vertical relationships can be organized through mar-
ket-based contractual arrangements or through vertical
integration, wherein the medical practice obtains ima-
ging and therapy services via direct ownership.
The boundaries of firms-in this case whether medical
practices should -make or buy” ancillary services-are a
function of a variety of factors, mainly scope economies
and transaction economies [37-43]. These factors can be
thought of as -organic” drivers of the boundaries and
scope of firms; the existence of these factors compels
firms to adopt purposeful forms of organization
designed to minimize operating costs and maximize
comparative advantage. The following sections discuss
these factors in more detail and in the context of ortho-
paedic medical practice and ancillary services.
Economies of scope
Cases where the costs of conjoint production are lower
than the costs of separate production are said to exhibit
economies of scope, [44] and economies of scope are an
important determinant of organizational boundaries
[45,46]. Economies of scope are likely to be present
when production relies on a common set of resources,
such as technology, core competencies, and dual-use
labor and capital inputs. Core competencies are particu-
larly relevant to health care organizations, which rely
disproportionately on highly trained human capital.
Core competencies refer to firms’ stock of knowledge
assets (including tacit knowledge and know-how), skills,
capabilities, learning processes, and resources. By diver-
sifying and expanding into activities that are related to
core competencies, firms are able to take better advan-
tage of knowledge sharing, learning processes, and
improved managerial efficiency [47-49].
Concentrating on scope economies and core compe-
tencies enhances the learning process by assuring that
decision-making situations are repeated in sufficiently
large numbers [50]. The role of learning depends on the
ability of the firm to process information during the
production process and apply the information appropri-
ately. The learning process is critical to the formation
and adaptation of organizational routines, which include
rules of thumb, guidelines, templates, and protocols
[51]. Specialized routines are the subcomponents of
organizational -know how” and core competencies and
are often sources of comparative advantage and produc-
tion economies [52-54].
There are several aspects of orthopaedic IOASs that
suggest the presence of economies of scope. Aiken et al.
(2008) found that when orthopaedic surgeons work clo-
sely with PTs they were more likely to recommend non-
surgical treatment options [55]. This finding was also
observed during wartime, when military orthopaedic
surgeons facing increasing caseloads were able to treat a
larger volume of patients by triaging cases between sur-
gical and non-surgical treatment pathways [56]. Simi-
larly, there appear to be synergies associated with
















Figure 1 Vertical Relationships in Orthopaedic Practices.
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In a study by Dutton et al. (2003), multidisciplinary hos-
pital rounds for trauma patients included trauma center
physicians, orthopaedic surgeons, physical therapists,
and other members of the trauma care team [57]. The
study found that the implementation of interdisciplinary
teams reduced hospital lengths of stay by 36%.
The synergies observed in interdisciplinary teams are
attributable in part to improved information flow. There
are likely to be considerable benefits associated with
improved flow of clinical information among members
of the patient care team (orthopaedic surgeons, physical
therapists, physician assistants, nurses, etc.) and between
the care team and the patient. Often referred to as -cor-
ridor consultations,” physicians and PTs can consult
with one another with very little scheduling or planning
[58].
One example of the benefits of better PT-physician
communication is order clarification. There is some evi-
dence that physicians typically provide non-specific and
sometimes unclear referral diagnoses to PTs; according
to one study, only 32% of physician referrals were
judged to contain critical information regarding anatomy
and pathology [59]. Orthopaedic surgeons and PTs prac-
ticing together have the potential to reduce these ineffi-
ciencies in knowledge transfer and face few
impediments to doing so. In addition, physicians tend to
underestimate pain and overestimate functioning [60],
which suggests potential benefits from improved post-
treatment communication between patients and physi-
cians; in-office PTs offer a conduit for this type of infor-
mation feedback.
Transaction costs
There are two limitations to relying on scope economies
alone to explain organizational boundaries. First, scope
economies do not imply ownership; alternative forms of
organization can be designed to capture economies of
scope. Second, scope economies apply only to produc-
tion technology and processes, and do not take into
account demand-side factors. Transaction cost econom-
ics, however, has the advantage of addressing both sup-
ply and demand factors, and extends beyond scope and
scale economies by focusing on the transaction as the
unit of analysis [37,38,61,62]. The theoretical basis of
transaction cost economics is that the boundaries of
organizations are in part a function of the nature of the
business transacted, where relatively complex transac-
tions are more efficiently organized in settings that fea-
ture stronger administrative controls. Transaction
complexity is a function of several factors; in health care
settings, the most prominent forms of transaction com-
plexity are uncertainty and imperfect information [63].
Uncertainty and imperfect information lead to increased
production costs on the part of suppliers and increased
search costs on the part of consumers.
All forms of governance exhibit strengths and weak-
nesses in organizing transactions. Uncomplicated trans-
actions can be handled efficiently by organizational
forms that lack strong controls, such as commodity
markets and simple contracts. However, as transactions
become more complex, they are most efficiently orga-
nized within forms of governance that offer stronger
controls. In some cases, the most efficient means of
organizing complex transactions is via full integration
through ownership. The advantages of administrative
controls, however, must be traded off with the increased
bureaucratic costs associated with integration and, in
the case of orthopaedic surgery practices owning IOASs,
the possibility of added expenditures due to increased
utilization.
In the market for medical care, consumer transaction
costs are the costs incurred by the consumer to com-
plete a transaction, including the time necessary to
implement informed choice, such as evaluating, choos-
ing and locating a care provider, as well as the time
spent directly obtaining the services. Obtaining medical
care requires non-trivial time input on the part of con-
sumers, particular those over the age of 65. Based on
our analysis of the 2009 American Time Use Survey
(ATUS), Americans over the age of 65 devote approxi-
mately 108 hours per year in the primary activity of
obtaining medical care services, including time spent
obtaining, receiving, and purchasing services. Applying a
median wage to this age group of $20 per hour,[64] this
amounts to approximately $2,160 per person per year,
or about 12% of total per capita medical care spending
for the age group [65]. The effort required to obtain
medical care is also reflected to some degree in -ease of
access” measures. The Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality’s report on National Health Disparities
reported that 60-70% of the insured population -per-
ceived difficulties or delays in obtaining care and pro-
blems getting care as soon as it is wanted.” [66]
Although unmet need and pent-up demand are diffi-
cult to measure directly, there is some indication that
these factors are important in IOAS demand and utiliza-
tion. For example, in the case of PT, according to one
study the proportion of patients with perceived need for
PT but receiving no PT services increased during the
two-year post-discharge period from 23% to 68%, sug-
gesting substantial unmet need in physical therapy that
increased with time from discharge [67]. In the case of
imaging, the issue has more to do with the wide range
of factors driving imaging decisions than unmet imaging
need. For example, Carey and Garrett (1996) found that
the use of CT and MRI for low back pain patients was
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associated primarily with patient characteristics, such as
baseline functional status [68].
IOASs can be viewed to a certain extent as a response
to these transaction costs. In the case of PT, these costs
include finding a PT (or a set of potential or -feasible”
PTs), determining the quality of the PT, determining
the location of the practice and traveling to the facility.
Consumer transaction costs are expected to be lower in
the case of IOASs because patients have ready access to
ancillary services and have the opportunity to economize
on indentifying, vetting, locating and traveling to a pro-
vider [69]. In addition, there are several convenience-
related benefits associated with IOASs, including easier
scheduling, enhanced adherence to treatment plans
[70,71], and -one-stop shopping.”[58,72-75]
The latter benefit has been challenged in a recent
study by Sunshine and Bhargavan (2010), who examined
Medicare claims showing a visit to a specialist (an
-index” visit) followed by an imaging claim associate
with the same physician (i.e., a self-referred imaging ser-
vice) [36]. The authors found that 74% of self-referred
x-rays were conducted on the same day as the index
visit, but only 15% of CTs and MRIs were conducted on
the same day. The authors conclude that these data
imply the absence of a -one-stop shopping” benefit to
consumers, especially for CT and MRI. However, the
study has two significant limitations. First, there is
clearly a one-stop shopping benefit associated with
some ancillary services, such as x-ray and ultrasound,
which are relatively quick procedures unlikely to pro-
long an office visit. Second, the findings on CT and
MRI most likely reflect the fact that advanced imaging
requires more time, and prolonging a visit is not neces-
sarily feasible for time-constrained patients. Moreover,
these data do not reflect the likely convenience asso-
ciated with on-site scheduling of CT and MRI scans and
the reduced search costs associated with follow-up care
(e.g., choosing providers, locating providers, and deter-
mining managed care network status).
Another important aspect of transaction economies is
that medical care embodies -temporal specificities” in that
diagnosis and treatment outcomes depend not only on
which diagnostic test or treatment is performed, but also
when the diagnosis or treatment is performed. Diagnosis
and treatment timing is dependent on a variety of factors,
including disease progression and symptoms, availability
of providers, and patient adherence to treatment plans.
For example, Gilbert et al. (2004) conducted a randomized
controlled trial of patients with low back pain, and found
that patients who received -early” imaging had better clini-
cal outcomes than those who did not receive early imaging
[27]. IOASs are a means of optimizing the timing of diag-
nostic testing (in the case of in-office imaging) and treat-
ment (in the case of in-office PT).
Other factors
Scope economies and transaction economies are the
main drivers of vertical integration [43,76]. However, in
some cases the motivation to vertically integrate may be
driven simply by a desire to capture the profits of
upstream and downstream firms. This view of vertical
integration is the least prominent determinant of organi-
zational boundaries, primarily because it lacks a -corpo-
rate coherence” component;[77] that is, were firms
simply interested in acquiring profitable entities, the
ownership of any profitable enterprise would suffice,
and ownership of stocks, bonds and securitized assets
are more convenient means of earning returns from
profitable enterprises.
Nevertheless, critics of physician ownership of IOASs
focus on this rationale in their depiction of vertical inte-
gration among medical practices and ancillary services.
The crux of the argument is that asymmetrical and
imperfect information allow some types of service pro-
fessionals to -induce” demand for their services; that is,
suppliers, -experts” in particular, have the ability to shift
the demand curves of their customers [78,79]. In the
medical care context, supplier-induced demand (SID) is
defined as -the effect that doctors (or some other group
of professionals), as providers of services, may have in
creating more patient demand than there would be if
they acted as perfect agents for their patients."[[80],
p.333] Whereas several of the earlier studies of physician
SID were hampered by study design and endogeneity
problems (for a critique refer to Dranove and Wehner
[81]), more recent studies controlling for endogeneity
suggest that physicians are able to induce demand for
their services to some extent, depending on the type of
services and payment mechanisms [78,82-84].
There are two important limitations of relying on SID
as a theoretical basis for understanding the effects of
ownership. First, the better designed SID studies do not
draw clear distinctions between differences in vertical
relationships. Does full integration (via ownership) pro-
vide stronger inducement incentives than other forms of
vertical relationships, such as joint ventures and long-
term contracts? Afendulis and Kessler (2006) considered
interventional cardiologists (i.e., those who perform
diagnostic procedures and surgical treatment) as verti-
cally integrated entities, and found that interventional
cardiologists appear to be able to induce demand for
angioplasty. However, their study did not distinguish
among cardiologists who are full or part owners of car-
diac catheterization facilities from those who utilize
non-owned facilities via contract, such as hospital-
owned facilities.
The second limitation of employing SID to critique
integrated IOASs is that third-party payment mechan-
isms have evolved considerably in the past decade, and
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now typically contain a variety of administrative controls
on utilization and payment. When coupled with the
rapid diffusion of easily-accessible medical information
and better-informed patients, administrative controls
have placed limits on the intensity of SID [85-89]. In
some managed care settings, ancillary service referrals
require pre-authorization or pre-certification. This is
especially true in the case of advanced imaging, such as
CT and MRI. Thus, given that the literature generally
indicates that the pre-certification process is effective in
terms of reducing unnecessary services, [90-93] due to
the -sentinel” effect of pre-certification review, it is unli-
kely that a substantial proportion of pre-certified or pre-
authorized CTs or MRIs could be considered
inappropriate.
It is also important to note that, empirically, it is diffi-
cult for researchers to accurately assess the clinical
appropriateness of what may appear to be induced
demand. Much of the research on ancillary service utili-
zation is limited by inadequate controls for case mix
severity and other demand factors. Consequently, these
studies offer little evidence that higher utilization rates
resulting from self-referral to ancillary services represent
inappropriate or unnecessary care [94-96]. Thus, it is
possible that increases in utilization in part reflect
-pent-up” demand for services (i.e., services that would
have been performed at higher rates prior to integration
were there to have been sufficient capacity) rather than
inappropriate care. For example, Restuccia et al. (1996)
assessed whether the rate of inappropriate hospital
admissions is higher in areas with higher rates of hospi-
tal admissions. Seventy small geographic areas were
formed by grouping Massachusetts ZIP codes by simi-
larity of hospital use [97].
Appropriateness of hospital admission was measured
by applying an appropriateness protocol combined with
physician judgment based on chart review. The authors
found no relationship between hospital admission rates
and inappropriate admission rates, calling into question
the common assumption that areas with higher hospital
use have more inappropriate use of hospital care.
Appropriateness also appears to be insensitive to finan-
cial incentives, even on the part of price-sensitive consu-
mers [98,99]. Underscoring the fact that inappropriate
care is a by-product of any medical care transaction, a
study of the U.S. Veterans Health Administration (VA)
hospital system found evidence of relatively high levels of
inappropriate care in spite of the lack of financial incen-
tives to physicians associated with VA hospital admis-
sions [100]. Indeed, in their frequently cited study on
IOAS ownership, Mitchell and Scott (1992) concede that
-none of the studies to date...has been able to determine
whether the increased utilization...represents inappropri-
ate or unwarranted services.”[34]
Finally, another important consideration is that IOAS
integration implies the incurring of the operating costs
of the acquired entity. In order to directly employ PTs,
for example, orthopaedic surgeons must pay market sal-
aries (which average approximately $72,900; see [101]).
However, it is likely that salaried PTs will have some-
what lower productivity than self-employed PTs
[12,102-104]. Thus, an orthopaedic surgery practice will
have the same costs but earn less revenue than self-
employed PT practices, the net result of which will be
lower operating margins on PT services provided
through the orthopaedic practice. Moreover, when com-
pared to surgeons’ own marginal revenue on resource-
intensive procedures such as hip and knee replacement,
it is unlikely that low operating margins on ancillary ser-
vices provide sufficient financial incentives to invest in
IOASs. For all services performed by orthopaedic sur-
geons, the 50th percentile (median) billing rate per ser-
vice is approximately $2,300, compared to a median
billing rate per service of only $94 for PT (based on
data reported in [105]).
Discussion
The preceding section focused on two of the most com-
monly cited reasons for vertical integration-scope
economies and transaction economies. Scope economies
are likely to be an important factor in IOAS integration
because of the potential to improve the flow and conti-
nuity of medical care. There is some evidence of scope
economies in the case of physician integration into out-
patient therapy. Transaction economies are also impor-
tant to the integration decision, providing incentives for
physicians to monitor quality (including the timing of
ancillary services) and incentives for consumers to
reduce the costs associated with obtaining medical care.
There is some evidence of transaction economies in the
case of physician integration into imaging and outpati-
ent therapy. Other factors potentially influencing inte-
gration decisions include the capture of upstream and
downstream profits, but these incentives are likely to be
small compared to scope and transaction economies.
This leads to the pivotal policy question regarding tra-
deoffs: Are the economic benefits of integration worth
the potential costs incurred through demand induce-
ment and overutilization? To some extent policy makers
have answered this question by passing a variety of laws
restricting ownership, such as the Stark laws and the
recently enacted federal Affordable Care Act (ACA),
which places limits on physician ownership of acute-
care hospitals. However, the language of these laws, and
the content of the deliberations preceding the laws, gen-
erally lack explicit discussions of tradeoffs. Instead, the
principal rationale has been simply that ownership leads
to higher rates of demand inducement. In light of the
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preceding discussion, we argue that this view is too nar-
row, and has not allowed for the consideration of the
benefits of integration.
The latter point is worth emphasizing given the rapid
change in physician organizational arrangements over
the past decade [106-110]. Imperfect agency is a central
tenet of SID, but there are many factors that cause phy-
sicians to act as imperfect agents for their patients,
including, for example: (1) information asymmetry
between patient and physician; (2) financial incentives
associated with third-party payment mechanisms; and
(3) physician associations and business relationships (e.
g., joint ventures and other collaborative arrangements;
granting of admitting privileges; etc.) with medical
groups, practice associations, and hospitals. Each one of
these factors is enough to move physicians away from
-perfect” agency on behalf of patients and toward some
degree of imperfect agency [111-114]. The implication is
that it is not simply ownership that influences clinical
decision making and referral patterns, but a host of fac-
tors that are present in a variety of vertical relation-
ships-not limited to vertical integration.
Conclusions
The recent resurgence of controversy surrounding
orthopaedic surgeon ownership of IOASs has been dri-
ven by a handful of studies, some of which have shown
an association between orthopaedic surgeon ownership
of IOAS and utilization of the owned services. In this
paper we put forward a more balanced assessment of
the tradeoffs associated with vertical integration in gen-
eral and orthopaedic ownership of IOASs specifically.
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows.
First, any assessment of the effects of vertical integration
should account for the full set of tradeoffs associated
therewith, including the role of scope and transaction
economies. One limitation of our paper is that we do
not attempt to empirically measure these economies,
and rely instead on anecdotal evidence in the literature.
Future studies of physician integration into IOASs
should measure these effects and present a more com-
plete accounting of the tradeoffs.
Second, there is little upon which to base the assump-
tion that SID works differently in ownership arrange-
ments versus other forms of governance, such as joint
ventures, long-term contracts, and other tightly coupled
arrangements that may share some of the benefits of full
integration. A limitation of the extant literature (and of
this paper) is a lack of evidence comparing how SID
intensity might vary by organizational arrangement.
Until such studies are done, researchers should adopt a
more conservative stance by allowing for possibility of
differential SID effects across different organizational
forms of medical care delivery. Similarly, although there
have been some well-designed studies of SID in recent
years, there is a need for continued methodological vigi-
lance regarding SID studies, particularly with regard to
the handling of endogeneity and the definition of
ownership.
Third, even where these common empirical problems
are overcome, the task of identifying the appropriateness
of ancillary service use remains an important research
challenge. Whether IOAS ownership is undesirable
depends a great deal on whether induced services repre-
sent appropriate or inappropriate care. Given the lack of
consistent findings on inappropriate care in other set-
tings, there appears to be considerable room for further
research on the extent to which added ancillary services
are appropriate or inappropriate.
Endnotes
aFor example, refer to Maryland Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Associates, et al. v.
Maryland State Board of Physicians et al. (January 2011).
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